Young labour market entrants post a high level of unemployment and short-term contracts. In July 2002, the French government moved to reduce this insecurity at the start of working life by introducing the Youth-in-Business Contract (Contrat Jeune en Entreprise), a new contract for young people under 22 years old who dropped out of school before passing their final secondary school examinations. Under this scheme, firms were entitled to claim a subsidy when they hired an eligible young worker on an open-ended contract. We assess the impact of the Youth-in-Business Contract on transitions to permanent employment by estimating a dynamic difference-in-difference model drawing on the French Labour Force Survey. We use a new method, inspired by Keane and Sauer (2009) , to deal with measurement errors in the data. We find that programme eligibility has no effect on transitions to permanent employment in a recession environment.
Introduction
In many OECD countries, youth employment is insecure. Young workers have to endure a high level of unemployment and jobs on short-term contracts. These jobs can sometimes form stepping stones to better opportunities. However, in countries like France and Spain, with high levels of short-term jobs, dual labour markets emerge with more short-term contracts trapping some workers in job insecurity.
In July 2002, the French government moved to reduce this insecurity at the start of working life by introducing the Youth-in-Business Contract (Contrat Jeune en Enterprise, referred to hereinafter as the CJE ), a new active labour market policy contract for young people under 22 years old who dropped out of school before passing the baccalauréat, i.e. the secondary school examination that qualifies for entry to university. Under this scheme, firms were entitled to claim a subsidy whenever they hired an eligible young worker on an open-ended contract. French active labour market policies are generally monitored by the French public employment service and are budget capped, such that they theoretically target those with the greatest labour market difficulties. In an exception to this rule, CJE subsidies were automatically guaranteed provided the administrative criteria were met. Surprisingly, however, only half of the eligible employers claimed them.
We assess the impact of the CJE on transitions to permanent employment by estimating a dynamic difference-in-difference model drawing on the French Labour Force Survey. In 2002, however, the Labour Force Survey's design was thoroughly overhauled with extensive changes made to the employment status measurement method. This could bias the evaluation of the CJE's impact. Much work has been done to address misclassification problems in a discrete response setting. In this article, we use a new method, inspired by Keane and Sauer (2009) , to deal with classification error.
We find that the programme had no effect on the tendency to find permanent employment. A number of reasons can be put forward to explain this result. We could not observe whether young eligible workers making the transition to an open-ended contract were doing so on a CJE or not. We thus estimated merely the impact of eligibility, which may be less accurate (only 46% to 52% of firms declared their new, open-ended contract as a CJE). Over and above this, and taking our results to mean that the CJE has no significant effects on the integration of young workers, our conclusions are comparable with those for more general labour market policies targeting payroll tax reductions, as found by Kramarz and Philippon (2001) for example. The difference between the general payroll tax reduction assessed by Kramarz and Philippon and the CJE programme is that the CJE targeted less-educated young workers. We subsequently compared the CJE with the 1997 Spanish reform evaluated by Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2002) . Unlike these authors, we find that the public policy had no effect on youth transition to permanent employment. The French and Spanish reform designs differ, as do the environments surrounding their introduction. The Spanish reform introduced a payroll tax cut, as did the CJE, but it also reduced dismissal costs. It was launched in a growth period as opposed to the French programme, which was set up during an economic slowdown.
The article is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a brief survey of the literature on young workers' labour market integration. Section 2 describes the CJE programme. Section 3 presents the Labour Force Survey data and some descriptive statistics. Estimation and results are given in Section 4. The last section concludes.
I. Youth unemployment and labour market integration programmes
Youth unemployment has been running high in many OECD countries for decades. With the recent crisis, levels have shot up in some of these countries. From 2002 to 2009, for example, the unemployment rate for young workers aged 15 to 24 rose from 11% to 18.9% in the United Kingdom and from 22.2% to 37.9% in Spain. The overall increase in youth unemployment across all OECD countries is lower at 13.4% to 16.7% 4 . Bell and Blanchflower (2011) calculate the ratio of youth-to-adult unemployment and find that young workers are consistently more likely to be unemployed than adults. These authors calculate this ratio for the OECD countries in 2009 as ranging from 1.4 in Germany to more than 4.0 in countries such as Italy, Norway and Sweden. D. Bell and D. Blanchflower estimate a simple relationship between the youth and adult unemployment rates across countries from 1970 to 2009 to establish that youth unemployment rose more sharply than adult unemployment over this period. They find that youth unemployment rates are almost twice as sensitive to the business cycle as adults, lending support to previous findings that youth unemployment rates are more sensitive to the business cycle. This phenomenon is all the more worrying in that youth unemployment has long-run implications. The ILO (2010) reports that it is associated with a greater risk of unemployment in adulthood, but also with economic exclusion and labour market withdrawal at a later age. This result is backed up by Bell and Blanchflower (2011) . These authors draw on data on the 1958 birth cohort in the British Child Development Study, noting that spells of unemployment when young create permanent insecurity and have long-lasting effects on a number of outcomes such as unemployment at 50 years old, earnings, job satisfaction, life satisfaction and health.
Many programmes in recent decades have targeted young workers in an attempt to address this problem. A significant body of literature presents and evaluates Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs hereinafter) for young people 5 . Traditionally, active labour market programmes for young people are based on four main instruments: job search assistance and monitoring, training, employment subsidies in the private sector, and subsidized public jobs. No clear-cut finding emerges from the evaluation of ALMPs for young people. Results are mixed depending mostly on context, programme content and the targeted young workers in question. In its guidance note, the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2010) recommends building inclusive programmes combining skills acquisition, employment-and income-generating opportunities, literacy and remedial education where needed, vocational and job training, job search assistance and other support services. Even though most ALMPs for young people combine a number of these instruments, only a few of them provide such integrated processes. The British New Deal for young unemployed 18-to-24 year olds is a good example of such a combination. It introduced an extensive programme of assistance for young workers unemployed for at least six months. Young people were first provided intensive job search assistance for four months. If they remained unemployed after this period, they were required to choose one of four options: the employment option (offering subsidies), full-time education and training, the voluntary sector option or the environment task force option. The evaluation of the British New Deal was planned at the same time as the programme was designed. The results concluded it had a positive impact on youth employment (White and Riley, 2002; Van Reenen, 2003 ). The British New Deal then became the Flexible New Deal in October 2009 to tackle the huge rise in youth unemployment in the UK due to the financial crisis. This second wave of the public policy, building on the results of the previous evaluations, was designed to provide a more personalized approach for disadvantaged young people. In some European countries, young workers have another burden in addition to unemployment. Young people, for the most part with a low level of education, experience job insecurity at the beginning of their working lives. They alternate between short-term contracts and spells of unemployment. Although the UK, France, Italy and Spain have virtually the same temporary employment proportions at 10% to 15% of total employment (OECD, 2010), the picture is totally different when focused solely on young people. In 2009, the share of temporary employment among 15-to-24 year olds stood at 11.9% in the UK, 51.2% in France, 44.4% in Italy and 55.9% in Spain, while the OECD average was 24.5% for young people and 11.6% for population as a whole.
The huge rise in short-term contracts in some European countries has prompted great debate in the economic literature. Articles published for a symposium on temporary work (Booth, Dolado and Franck, 2002) illustrate the differences in the role played by short-term contracts in the worker integration process. It is highly dependent on the general structure of the labour market. In the UK, the proportion of permanent and non-permanent contracts remained relatively stable in the 1990s and Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2002) find some evidence that short-term contracts are stepping stones to permanent jobs. However, temporary workers have lower levels of job satisfaction, receive less training and are less well-paid. Therefore, the creation of temporary jobs as a substitute for permanent jobs comes at a cost. In Spain, Dolado, GarciaSerrano and Jimeno (2002) find that liberalising the conditions for the use of short-term contracts did not lead to the development of stepping-stone jobs, but contributed to the emergence of a dual labour market. They posit that aside from the plausible benefits of higher flexibility, the rise in short-term contracts may also have adverse effects on equity grounds. The surge in temporary employment has mixed effects on unemployment. On the one hand, the lower dismissal costs associated with short-term contracts seem to have contributed to employment growth. On the other hand, there have been some unexpected negative consequences stemming from the existence of a segmented/dual labour market, such as lower investment in human capital, greater wage pressure, a more unequal distribution of periods of unemployment, lower labour mobility and fertility rates, and a broader wage spread.
In the French case, Beffy, Coudin and Rathelot (2008) attempt to separate out the stepping-stone effect from the insecurity trap effect of short-term contracts. In a dual labour market, employers may consider a history of unemployment and short-term jobs as a negative sign of the worker's ability and may then offer the worker only insecure jobs. The authors estimate the proportion of workers trapped in this situation using a mover-stayer approach, which distinguishes workers who remain stuck in insecurity from those who may have access to stable jobs and benefit from an integration process. Their model is estimated using a sample of adults aged 30-to-49 years old. The authors find that individuals who transit only between unemployment, short-term jobs and non-participation, represent about 5% of the total population. Moreover, they find that individuals who fall into this trap are more likely to be less educated, young and single.
To avoid such a phenomenon, the French, Italian and Spanish governments have introduced public policies to encourage employers to hire workers, or specific categories of workers, on permanent contracts. The 2001 Italian Finance Law established a tax credit for firms choosing to hire workers on permanent contracts rather than short-term contracts. Using the reform as an identification device, Cipollone and Guelfi (2006) estimate the firm's willingness to trade short-term contracts for a cut in the labour cost of permanent jobs. The cut in labour costs is 9% to 60%, depending on the industry and geographical area. The authors estimate labour demand for short-term contracts compared with permanent contracts as a function of relative wage and firm-specific controls and derive from that the monetary value that firms attach to fixed-term contracts. The results are based on a panel of Italian firms in the engineering sector. Their estimates suggest that the tax credit had a considerable effect and may help explain recent employment growth in Italy.
In Spain, the government has implemented three successive reforms. The first, the 1994 reform, did not target specific groups of workers. In 1994, new regulations limited the use of temporary contracts to seasonal jobs and the reform slightly relaxed dismissal conditions for permanent contracts. In practice, employers continued to hire workers under temporary contracts for all types of jobs. Güell and Petrongolo (2007) study the impact of the 1994 reform on the labour market structure. More generally, these authors estimate the duration and determinants of the conversion of fixed-term contracts into permanent contracts using the Spanish Labour Force Survey. They test four theoretical predictions: (i) heterogeneity in the timing of the conversion of short-term contacts into permanent contracts; (ii) higher worker productivity increases the likelihood of conversion in general, but in particular it raises the likelihood of an early conversion; (iii) higher firing costs reduce the likelihood of conversion and a later use of conversions by employers; and (iv) better outside options and bargaining power for workers increase the likelihood of early conversion and leave unchanged that of late conversion. In their study, skills are a proxy for productivity, firing costs are determined by the institutional environment, and skills and sector unemployment rates are a proxy for the outside options. The results show that the conversion rate at most durations is higher for educated workers than for the less skilled. These findings are in line with the theoretical predictions: skilled workers tend to have more productive job matches, which are thus more likely to be converted before the legal limit. The less skilled would generally be expected to be in a weaker bargaining position than the skilled, as they are more easily replaced. Moreover, in a high unemployment scenario, the skilled may take on unskilled jobs, crowding out the less skilled. The 1994 reform may well have successfully affected the use of temporary contracts, inducing employers to effect earlier rather than later conversions, but the post-1994 conversion rates were lower than before.
Given that the level of short-term contracts remained high after the 1994 reform, a new reform was implemented in 1997 and extended in 2001. Contrary to the 1994 reform, the legislation on short-term contracts was not strengthened. Regulatory changes applied to permanent jobs and targeted specific worker groups. The 1997 reform reduced dismissal costs for unfair dismissal by about 25% and payroll taxes by 40% to 90% for newly signed permanent contracts and for conversions of temporary contracts after the second quarter of 1997 for workers under 30 years of age, over 45 years of age, the long-term unemployed, women underrepresented in their occupations and disabled workers. Severance pay for unfair dismissals on newly signed contracts in affected groups was reduced from 45 to 33 days' wage per year worked and the maximum was reduced from 42 to 24 months' wage. Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2002) find evidence of an increase in permanent employment probabilities for the young after the second quarter of 1997, but they also find higher employment probabilities for the young during the boom of the late 1980s. The young appear to benefit disproportionately during economic upturns, thus it is not clear whether the increase in the share of permanent jobs is due to the improvement in the economic situation or to the reform. To disentangle both explanations, Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz compare the employment of the under-30s and over-45s with the employment of the medium age bracket using a triple difference estimator to control for agespecific cyclical effects. They find that the reduction in payroll taxes and dismissal costs increased the employment of young workers on permanent contacts. They suggest a reasonably elastic response of permanent employment to non-wage labour costs for young workers. They also find positive effects for the transitions from unemployment and temporary employment to permanent employment for young workers. Transitions from permanent employment to nonemployment increased only for older men, i.e. the reform had little effect on dismissals.
Changes to the legislation governing short-term and open-ended contracts in the reforms presented above illustrate that, in most cases, short-term contracts are considered to be a way of introducing flexibility in countries with a high level of protection in their employment legislation. In order to slow down the spread of short-term contracts, governments decide either on stricter conditions for short-term contracts, stepping up employment protection, or decide to alleviate the costs of terminating open-ended contracts. The French government chose an alternative path to give low-skilled young workers more secure paths and improve their integration into the labour market. In 2002, the French government introduced the Youth-in-Business Contract (CJE) in a move to prevent the recurring unemployment of young workers. This contract may be seen as a mix between an active labour market policy and a more general reform, targeting young people with a low level of education. It was introduced to reduce the number of short-term contracts by encouraging employers to hire young people on permanent jobs. The following sections contain details of the programme and an evaluation of its effects on integration.
II. The Youth-in-Business Contract (CJE)
The 2002 French elections gave rise to a sea change in government. Prior to May 2002, the French President and the parliamentary majority represented different parties. With the elections, the French parliamentary majority, a rainbow coalition of socialists, communists and ecologists, went to the right-wing majority. This brought about a radical change in terms of political support for youth employment.
A major left-wing government programme to support youth employment was the Youth Employment Contract (Emploi Jeunes). These contracts were designed to cover new needs and employment prospects in the public sector. They were fixed-term, generally five-year contracts. They were intended mostly for young workers with some qualifications. Contract length was based on the idea that a real integration and training process needs time to give young workers professional skills.
The newly elected government changed course completely, looking more toward a liberal direction. Public employment subsidies made way for private employment grants in the form of the Youth-in-Business Contract (Contrat Jeune en Entreprise, hereinafter called the CJE). The focus was now on integrating young people with few or no qualifications into the private sector. The new contract targeted young people under 22 years old, who dropped out of school before passing the baccalauréat, the secondary school examination that qualifies for entry to university in France. Programme eligibility was quite broad based. All employers were entitled to claim the subsidy when they hired an eligible young worker on a permanent contract, i.e. on an openended contract (OEC). The subsidy amount depended on the wage paid. It ranged from €225 at the minimum wage to a maximum of €292.50 per month for full-time workers. The grant was proportional to the part-time ratio for part-time workers. Employers received the subsidies for two years and then half the monthly allowance in the third year. The counterpart was that no dismissal, except for professional misconduct, was allowed for the first three years of the contract.
The subsidy amount needs to be put into the French context of the period. The labour cost situation was quite complicated at that time due the gradual shortening of the working week starting in 1997 (Askenazy, 2008) . Payroll tax incentive policies were introduced each step of the way from the 39-hour to the 35-hour working week. Tax breaks could be claimed along with lower charges on low-wage workers, effective in France as of 1995. The tax break was calculated ac-cording to the length of the working week in the firm, the date of the shortening of the working week to less than 39 hours a week and, in some cases, the date of the hiring of the employee. 6 In 2002, in firms still on a 39-hour week, the tax breaks on the minimum wage came to 18.2% of the gross wage. The 39-hour minimum wage stood at €1,154 per month. The monthly tax break thus came to €210. The CJE subsidy, equal to €225per month, corresponded to an additional 19.49% tax cut. Both were in the same range. Moreover, adding the two together, we get a 37.69% payroll tax cut, which is nearly equal to the total amount of payroll tax for a worker in 2002. For firms with a shorter working week, the tax cut was higher due to the incentive device. However, the CJE subsidy still represented more than 40% of the tax break. The CJE tested quite a new approach to French active labour market policies for young workers. It had in common with traditional labour market policies that it was aimed at a specific group: unskilled youth. However, its design and generality also brought it within the range of measures to reduce labour costs. UNEDIC, the organization in charge of collecting employer contributions, managed the measure. This choice may seem surprising because, at the time that UNEDIC was entrusted with this task, 7 it had no specific placement assignment. In fact, the choice of UNEDIC was a simple piece of subcontracting, not a real partnership to implement public policy. (2007) estimates that a mere 46% to 52% of the firms eligible for the grant claimed it. The explanation put forward by the author is a lack of information. Information for employers was indeed probably far from perfect in view of quite complicated labour market legislation. The initial information campaign was limited to flyers sent to employers by UNEDIC. Employers who claimed the benefit had to fill in a form and provide some administrative papers. Small businesses with little or no specialized administrative services could well have seen even these formalities as burdensome. Moreover, the national employment agencies did not really include this measure in their work placement tool kit. One of the striking features highlighted by Casaux (2007) when describing the measure is the high annual rate of terminated CJE contracts. In 2005, only 37% of CJE contracts had lasted at least three years. Nearly two-thirds of the terminations were due to resignations. The contracts signed with the young workers were mostly in trade and services and, as pointed out by Le Goff (1997) , the real term of employment, even on a permanent contract, can be short in these sectors. This author finds high quit rates from jobs with low career opportunities. CJE jobs were therefore no exception.
III. Survey design and descriptive statistics
The data used to estimate the impact of the CJE on transitions to an open-ended contract are taken from the French Labour Force Survey conducted by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) . This survey provides information on the labour market status of French households and is representative of the French population aged 15 and over. The survey's timing and questionnaire were altered in 2002. Up until 2002, the survey was conducted each year in March. Each household was interviewed three times over three consecutive years. In 2002, the survey switched to a quarterly schedule. Households are now interviewed every quarter over an 18-month period.
The selected sample is made up of 48,041 school leavers aged 19 to 26 years old from 2000 to 2004. We observe their quarterly employment sequences with 1 to 10 observations depending on their sampling and birth dates. Descriptive sample statistics are given in Table 1. (Insert Table 1) The sample is composed unsurprisingly of nearly half of each gender and the age distribution is quite homogeneous. About 45% of the sample dropped out of school without the baccalauréat. More than 44% of the sampled individuals were working on a permanent contract on their first interview date and this number was up 6% by the last interview date. More than half of the contracts were in the trade and service sectors.
Prior to 2002, each individual had to fill in a professional calendar covering the past year on each interview date. The calendar questionnaire showed if people were working on a permanent contract. The retrospective calendar was maintained in the quarterly survey, but only at the first interview. In following waves, information on labour market status was contained in the core questionnaire. The information was provided by two questions instead of one in the calendar questionnaire, but is more accurate for our study. We know if a sampled individual is employed and has an open-ended contract. The OEC is the legal contract providing eligibility for the CJE. However, both measurements of labour market status (calendar and core questionnaire) are simultaneously available from the first interview of the new LFS survey.
The change in survey design is a major concern for the evaluation of the impact of the CJE as it occurred at the very moment of programme implementation. Table 2 uses data from the first interview in the 2002 to 2004 waves of the Labour Force Survey to show the differences in answers depending on the choice of indicator. The indicators are similar only in 93% to 98% of cases. We take this point into account in the following.
(Insert Table 2 )
IV. The CJE and transitions to permanent contracts a) Basic difference-in-difference estimators
In the following, we estimate the impact of the CJE as the change it effects in the probability of being hired on an open-ended contract, before and after the date of the reform, for young workers eligible or not for the programme. Taking the vocabulary used by the Active Labour Market Policies evaluation framework, we define treatment groups made up of young workers eligible for the programme, and control groups made up of young workers not eligible for the programme, but with very similar characteristics.
We define three subsamples for the study to test sensitivity to the definition of the groups. In a first step, we select only young workers aged 21 to 24 years old without any technical higher education or university qualifications. We denote this group subsample 1 and take it as the reference group hereafter. In recent years, labour market prospects for secondary school dropouts and baccalauréat holders without any higher education have been quite similar. Their employment prospects are lower than those for young people with technical higher education or a university degree. We select this subgroup as it allows for the closest match between control and treatment groups. In a second step, in subsample 2, we extend the age range to young people aged 19 to 26 years old. In a third step, in subsample 3, we consider everyone aged 19 to 26, without any exclusion criteria as to level of education, to check the robustness of our results in a case with a sharper contrast between control and treatment groups.
In her article, Casaux (2007) estimates that just 46% to 52% of eligible firms actually claimed the grant. This means that part of the young eligible workers' transitions to open-ended contracts was not subsidized. Our dataset does not contain precise information in that it does not show whether young eligible workers making a transition to a permanent contract were entering into a CJE or not. We are thus in an intention to treat analytic framework based on the initial treatment intent, not on the treatment eventually administered. In other words, we do not estimate participation in the CJE measure as such, but the impact of eligibility for the CJE on the lesseducated young workers' transitions to permanent contracts. However, this impact (Average Treatment Effect) is the policy-relevant efficiency outcome we are looking for. Table 3 presents the probabilities of transition to an open-ended contract by gender. For each subsample, we have worked out four probabilities: probability of transition for the group of young eligible workers before the reform date, probability of transition for the group of young non-eligible workers before the reform date; probability of transition for the group of young eligible workers after the reform date and probability of transition for the group of young noneligible workers after the reform date. The difference between the first two provides the difference in integration between educated and less-educated young workers before the CJE. The difference between the last two provides the same information following the programme's introduction. The difference-in-difference estimator provides the effect of the CJE on the integration of young unskilled workers.
Looking at the young men in subsample 1, we note that, before and after July 2002, the transition rate to an open-ended contract is always higher for those over 23 years or with a baccalauréat than for the younger or less-educated workers. We do not disentangle the age effect (being over 22) from the qualification effect (with the baccalauréat). We merely note that the youngest unskilled individuals have a lower probability of making a transition to a permanent contract. From this point of view, an active labour market programme explicitly targeting this population is relevant. Looking at the results in Table 3 , the difference in the probability of finding a long-term job between the young unskilled workers and the other group narrows following the introduction of the CJE, pointing to an improvement in the integration of eligible young men on the labour market.
We obtain the same results for every subsample, excepting young unskilled women in subsample 1. In this case, the basic difference-in-difference estimator is negative, but very small (-0.06 percentage points). Otherwise, we observe the same phenomena. Older, more qualified young workers post higher transition rates to permanent contracts than the younger, lesseducated, but the difference narrows after the introduction of the CJE. The transition rates are higher in the graduate group and are always lower for young women than for young men. When positive, the basic difference-in-difference estimators are bounded between 0.15 and 0.58, which represents 3% to 10% of the transition rates for the eligible groups before the introduction of the programme.
(Insert Table 3 )
b) Empirical model
The basic difference-in-difference estimators are worked out without controlling for the changes in the survey definition of permanent contracts between the waves of the French Labour Force Survey. In view of this, the positive effect observed on the transition rates could be spurious and due to the change in definition. Moreover, Table 4 does not provide the standarderrors for the basic estimators. To overcome these shortcomings, we estimate a dynamic probit model defined as:
where y it is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a young worker has an open-ended contract and the value 0 otherwise. We define y it * as the corresponding latent variable. This variable is unobserved, but is considered to be the endogenous variable driving the decision process. Latent labour market status at time t is assumed to be a function of lagged labour market status at time t-1, covariates X 1t and X 0t , and the CJE programme defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 for eligible young people after July 2002.  1 and  0 are parameters.  is the parameter of interest. It summarizes the impact of the programme on the treatment group compared with the control group. The error terms of equation (1) are assumed to be normal and identically and independently distributed.
To tackle the question of the two definitions of permanent contracts, we draw on the literature's framework of ill-measured qualitative dependant variables and measurement error 9 .
We consider that the labour market status variable is known with a measurement error after 2002 compared with the information provided in the first waves, taken as the reference. In the present case, we can estimate the measurement error process non-parametrically. We have indeed both measurements at the first interview in the 2002 to 2004 waves of the LFS. We define the measurement-error process as:
and (2) where y it is the dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if a young worker has an OEC and 0 otherwise, when labour market status is assumed to be observed without measurement error.
it ỹ is the same indicator when the information is known with measurement error.
We estimate the model using simulated maximization likelihood methods in keeping with Keane and Sauer (2008) . We simulate H different histories ( ) on the basis of the empirical model (1) and we consider the contributions to likelihood given by equation (2). Unlike Keane and Sauer, not all dependent variables are ill-measured in our dataset. To deal with this, we propose a combined solution where we simultaneously use a classic GHK 10 (GewekeHajivassiliou-Keane) method for observations without measurement error and the Keane and Sauer method elsewhere. The parameters of the measurement-error process (i.e. and ) are estimated marginally and plugged directly into the maximum likelihood function 11 .
c) Results
Estimation results are given in tables 4 to 6. They are presented in detail for the first subsample. For subsamples 2 and 3, we present only the coefficient of interest, i.e. the coefficient of the dummy variable indicating eligibility for the CJE program, defined by a dummy variable equal to 1 for eligible young people after July 2002. The first six coefficients in each regression 9 The presence of an ill-measured qualitative dependent variable in non-linear models generally leads to biased estimated parameters. Much work has been done to address misclassification problems in a discrete response setting. Many papers (including Poterba and Summers (1995) , Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998), Magnac and Visser (1999) , Neuhaus (1999) , Ramalho (2002) and, more recently, Keane and Sauer (2009)) show that bias may be large and that correction procedures are therefore needed. 10 See, for example, Gourieroux and Montfort's book (1996) 11 Details of the maximum likelihood simulated method are available upon request from the authors. in table 4 and 5 explain the propensity to stay in a permanent contract. The next seven coefficients depict the propensity to make a transition to a permanent contract. Table 4 gives the results without taking into account the measurement error process. Table 5 presents the results for the more general model, correcting for measurement differences between the two surveys. In every regression, transition to a permanent contract is lower for less-educated young people and the probability of staying in a permanent contract lower for less-educated young men. We also observe a period effect. The coefficients associated with the probability of securing a permanent contract or staying in a permanent contract during the CJE period are always negative or not significant. The CJE was indeed set up during an economic slump. After an upbeat economic with GDP growth above Tables 4 and 5 show the repercussions of this slowdown on young workers' employment.
The coefficient of the CJE dummy variable, in bold, is statistically non-significant for both gender in both models. Changes in the value of this coefficient are considerable when the measurement error process is introduced into the regression. However, since all the coefficients are statistically non-significant, we will not comment on this any further. Robustness checks made using subsample 2 and subsample 3 exhibit the same non-significant results. The introduction of the CJE therefore did not appear to improve the permanent employment prospects of the less-educated young people it targeted.
(Insert Tables 4 to 6)

d) Comments
A number of reasons can be put forward to explain this result. The first is technical. When a young eligible worker makes a transition to an open-ended contract, we cannot observe precisely whether this contract is a CJE or not. We cannot estimate the real effect of the programme, but merely the impact of eligibility, which may be less accurate. However, this technical point has to do with the design of the CJE policy. How can we explain that only half of the firms eligible for the subsidy claimed it? As soon as the administrative conditions were satisfied, the subsidy was automatically approved. The counterpart that no dismissal was allowed, except for reasons of professional misconduct, during the first three years of the contract may have prevented employers from entering the programme. As suggested by Casaux (2007) , the explanation may be also driven by a lack of information. Red tape is also often put forward to explain the reluctance of firms to take up public policies. We are unable here to distinguish between these different potential reasons.
Over and above this, and taking our results as indicating no significant effects of the CJE on the integration process of young workers, our conclusions are comparable to more general labour market policies of payroll tax reductions. Kramarz and Philippon (2001) estimate the impact of payroll tax subsidies in effect in France from 1995 to 2003. 1995 introduced the same level of change in payroll tax as the one provided by the CJE contract in 2002. Focusing on the 1990-1998 period, the authors turn up no clear-cut results on the transition from non-employment to employment. More precisely, tax subsidies have a small and insignificant impact on entry from non-employment.
The difference between the general payroll tax break evaluated by Kramarz and Philippon and the CJE programme is the public policy's targeting of less-educated young workers. In this way, the policy is more comparable with the Spanish reform of 1997. As already described in Section 2, the 1997 reform reduced dismissal costs for unfair dismissals by about 25% and payroll taxes by 40% to 90% for newly signed permanent contracts and for conversions of temporary contracts after the second quarter of 1997 for workers under 30 years of age, over 45 years of age, the long-term unemployed, women underrepresented in their occupations and disabled workers. The big difference between the French and Spanish policies is found in the dismissal cost, which did not exist in the CJE programme. The CJE measure even strengthened termination restrictions, as subsidies had to be reimbursed if employees on a CJE contract were fired for reasons other than misconduct. Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2002) posit that the reform increased permanent employment probabilities for young workers. For the authors, the results suggest that reducing the costs of permanent employment may be particularly worthwhile for young workers. A brief comparison of the two public policies points to the difference in effectiveness being due to the dismissal part of the Spanish employment policies.
Taking this track may raise some important questions for public decision-makers: should they turn a blind eye to unfair dismissals on the grounds that doing so may increase the permanent employment prospects of less-educated young people? Some arguments undermine this conclusion. Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2002) find higher employment probabilities for young people during the boom of the late 1980s. Young people do indeed appear to benefit disproportionately during economic upturns. We find here an expression of the conclusion of D. Bell and D. Blanchflower (2011) who establish, as already mentioned in Section 2, that youth unemployment is almost twice as sensitive to the business cycle as adult unemployment. In this case, it is not clear whether the increase in the share of permanent employment among young people is due to the improvement in the economic situation or to the reform. Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz control for this phenomenon by introducing some indicators for the growth period of the business cycle into their empirical model. They report that controlling for age-specific cyclical effects finds still-significant, but weaker effects on the probability of making a transition to permanent employment. This point sheds some light on the importance of considering the business cycle when interpreting our results. Contrary to the Spanish case, the CJE was introduced during an economic downturn. Our results therefore conclude that such a programme lacks effectiveness in a recession environment. The impact of payroll tax reduction policies to promote permanent contracts for less-educated young people may be asymmetrical. Moreover, the recent crisis has brought back up the question of the role of labour market institutions as a stabilizer during economic recession. More regulated labour markets seem to better contain the rise in unemployment using internal flexibility (Eichhorst, Feil and Marx, 2010) . In this case, there seem to be no clear grounds for promoting a reduction in dismissal costs to improve the effectiveness of a labour market policy like the CJE.
Conclusion
Young workers are subject to a high level of unemployment and short-term contracts. Policymakers have made many attempts to improve their integration into the labour market, especially since there are long-run implications to labour market problems among young people. Policymakers use different tools to tackle young workers' insecurity. They may promote targeted active labour market policies or develop more general labour or economic policies.
In this article, we focus on a specific French government labour market measure. In July 2002, in a move to reduce insecurity at the start of working life, the French government introduced the CJE, a new contract targeting young people under 22 years old who dropped out of school before passing the baccalauréat. Firms were entitled to claim a subsidy whenever they hired an eligible young worker on an open-ended contract. We assess the impact of the CJE on youth integration by estimating a dynamic difference-in-difference model using a new method, inspired by Keane and Sauer, to deal with measurement error in the data. On the basis of this model, we find that the CJE programme had no significant impact on transitions to permanent employment.
However, when a young eligible worker makes a transition to an open-ended contract, we cannot observe precisely whether this contract is a CJE or not. We thus estimate merely the impact of eligibility, which may be less accurate. Over and above this, and taking our results to mean that the CJE has no significant effects on the integration of young workers, our conclusions are comparable with those for more general labour market policies targeting payroll tax reductions, as found by Kramarz and Philippon (2001) for example. The difference between the general payroll tax break assessed by Kramarz and Philippon and the CJE programme is that the CJE targets less-educated young workers.
We subsequently compare the CJE with the 1997 Spanish reform evaluated by Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2002) . The 1997 reform reduced payroll and dismissal costs on targeted groups, including young workers, hired on permanent contracts. Unlike these authors, we find that the public policy had no effect on youth transition to permanent employment. The French and Spanish reform designs differ. The Spanish reform introduced a payroll tax cut, as did the CJE, but it also reduced dismissal costs whereas the CJE restricted the possibilities of dismissal. The difference in efficiency between the two public policies could be attributed to the difference in design, i.e. to the decrease in dismissal costs. Nevertheless, the two reforms also differ in terms of the environment into which they were introduced. Spain was on an economic upturn in 1997, whereas France's economy was slowing down in 2002. The fact that youth unemployment is highly sensitive to the business cycle may explain the asymmetry in the results.
This negative finding raises the question as to the appropriate design for market tools to improve the integration of low-skilled young people. Insecurity and employment status are very imperfectly linked. In particular (Le Goff, 1997) , people spend less time in jobs perceived as having poor internal mobility prospects or as being beneath their level of education. These jobs may well be on open-ended contracts. It is inefficient and inadequate to target such jobs blindly (using status classifications only), because they do not necessarily contribute to a skills-building experience or make the individual more easily employable. In fact, the CJE suffered from an absence of real management. It could not replace the usual scheme where placement agencies use subsidies as incentives to get firms to create vacancies or steer recruitment towards people with the greatest labour market difficulties. 
